Michael Ostrovsky
Assistant Professor of Economics, Stanford
4-5:30 pm
UM: 411 West Hall
WSU: 313 State Hall (via videoconference)
This paper studies matching in vertical networks, generalizing the theory of matching in two-sided markets. It gives sufficient conditions for the existence of stable networks and presents an algorithm for finding two of them. One is the best stable network for the agents on the “upstream” end of an industry. The other is best for the agents on the “downstream” end. The paper describes several properties of the set of stable networks and discusses applications of the theory to the design of matching markets with more than two types of agents and to the empirical analysis of supply chains. The paper is available at http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/ostrovsky/papers/chains.pdf.
Michael Ostrovsky is an Assistant Professor at the Stanford Graduate School of Business, where he teaches Managerial Economics in the first year of the MBA program. His research primarily concerns game-theoretic issues related to mechanism design, industrial organization, and corporate finance. Most recently, he has examined the design of Internet advertising auctions, the structure of stable vertical networks, and the forces influencing proxy voting by mutual funds. More information is available at https://gsbapps.stanford.edu/facultybios/biomain.asp?id=04598884
| Attachment | Size |
|---|---|
| Michael Ostrovsky seminar presentation slides | 264.12 KB |