Jacob K. Goeree
Professor of Economics, Caltech
4-5:30 pm
UM: 411 West Hall
WSU: 313 State Hall (via videoconference)
We introduce a new combinatorial auction format based on a simple, transparent pricing mechanism tailored for the hierarchical package structure proposed by Rothkopf, Pekec, and Harstad (1998) to avoid computational complexity. This combination provides the feedback necessary for bidders in multi-round auctions to discern winning bidding strategies for subsequent rounds and to coordinate responses to aggressive package bids. The resulting mechanism is compared to two leading alternatives in a series of laboratory experiments involving varying degrees of value synergies. Based on these “wind tunnel” tests the FCC has decided to use hierarchical package bidding in the major upcoming 700MHz auction.
Jacob Goeree joined Caltech in 2004 and continued theoretical and experimental research on auctions. To effectively execute the different auction experiments he started the development of {Auctions, a suite of open-source Java programs to conduct web-based auction experiments, including complex combinatorial auctions. His auction research also has a practical component in a significant market design problem, i.e. using combinatorial auctions to assign spectrum. The FCC intends to replace their simultaneous ascending auction with a combinatorial format and use experiments to test several alternatives. Charles Holt (Virginia) and Jacob wrote the design for such experiments. More information is available at http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~jkg/
| Attachment | Size |
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| Hierarchical Package Bidding: A Paper & Pencil Combinatorial Auction article pdf | 355.4 KB |