Tilman Börgers
Samuel Zell Professor of the Economics of Risk, UM
4-5:30 pm
UM: 411 West Hall
WSU: 313 State Hall (via videoconference)
The paper introduces a notion of complementarity (substitutability) of two signals which requires that in all decision problems each signal becomes more (less) valuable when the other signal becomes available. We provide a general characterization which relates complementarity and substitutability to a Blackwell-comparison of two auxiliary signals. In a special setting with a binary state space and symmetric binary signals, we find an explicit characterization that permits an intuitive interpretation of complementarity and substitutability. We demonstrate how these conditions extend to the general case. Finally, we study implications of complementarity and substitutability for information acquisition, for information revelation by a monopolist, and in a second price auction. The paper is available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~tborgers/BHK.pdf.
Tilman Börgers works on game theory and its applications. In game theory, he has explored the implications of various assumptions regarding players' knowledge about the game that they are playing and about other players' rationality. He has also studied models in which players play a game repeatedly, and use simple learning algorithms to adjust their strategies. Börgers' research on applications of game theory concerns auctions, voting and, more generally, mechanism design. He has advised several government agencies on auctions of spectrum licenses and on gas and electricity auctions. http://www-personal.umich.edu/~tborgers/
| Attachment | Size |
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| Tilman Borgers 2/14 seminar slides | 1.19 MB |