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» Feb 12 Seminar: Dirk Bergemann

Feb 12 Seminar: Dirk Bergemann

Date: 
Thu, 02/12/2009 - 11:00am - 12:30pm
Seminar Information: 

Dirk Bergemann

Professor of Economics, Yale University

"Robust Mechanism Design and Implementation: A Selective Survey"

Dirk Bergemann 2/12 seminar streaming audio file 

Location: 

UM: 1202 SI North, 1075 Beal Ave
WSU: 313 State Hall (via videoconference)

Dirk Bergemann
Seminar Description: 

The seminar is offered jointly with the Economics Theory Group.

The theory of mechanism design helps us understand institutions ranging from simple trading rules to political constitutions. We can understand institutions as the solution to a well defined planner’s problem of achieving some objective or maximizing some utility function subject to incentive constraints.

A common criticism of mechanism design theory is that the optimal mechanisms solving the well defined planner’s problem seem too sensitive to the assumed structure of the environment. We suggest a robust formulation of the mechanism design and implementation problem. The talk will be based on past and current work by the authors.

Background reading:

http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d15b/d1561-rr.pdf

http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirkb/pub/robust-mechanism.pdf

Seminar Speaker Bio: 

Dirk Bergemann, is the Douglass and Marian Campbell Professor of Economics, at the Department of Economics at Yale University. His most recent work is on robust mechanism design and dynamic allocation mechanisms. He has also worked on games with Bayesian learning and financial contracts. Bergemann earned a B.A. in economics and sociology at J.W. Goethe University in Frankfurt and a M.A. and Ph.D. in economics from the University of Pennsylvania. He came to Yale in 1995 as an assistant professor and has been affiliated with the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale since 1996.

Dirk Bergemann has received several grants from the National Science Foundation to support his research and also has been awarded fellowships from the Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellowship and the German National Science Foundation.

Bergemann is foreign editor for the Review of Economic Studies, and associate editor of several publications, among them Econometrica, Journal of Economic Theory and Games and Economic Behavior.

More information is available at http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/faculty/bergemann.htm.