Press Release and 
podcast -- Yahoo Answers users seek advice, opinion, as well as expertise in research by Mark Ackerman, Lada Adamic and STIET fellow Eytan Bakshy Press Release -- Bluffing in prediction markets research by Rahul Sami and STIET fellow, Stanko Dimitrov
Podcast discussing the STIET research program with Jeff MacKie-Mason and Tom Finholt
STIET video showing lifesize, uncompressed fiber-optic video conference from UM Atkins room to WSU via OptIPortalJason Hartline
Assistant Professor, McCormick School of Engineering, Northwestern University
4-5:30 pm
UM: 411 West Hall
WSU: 313 State Hall (via videoconference)
Suppose a designer would like a single mechanism that always performs well? Unfortunately, the Bayesian optimal mechanism of Myerson (1981) requires a different mechanism depending on the distribution of agent types. Of course, without distributional assumptions, there is no single auction that is always optimal (e.g., maximizes the seller's profit). We give a rigorous mathematical design and analysis framework in which to search for prior-free optimal auctions. We justify this framework through an explicitly connection to it to the Bayesian optimal mechanism. We give a prior-free mechanism that is approximates the optimal one, but leave open the question of the exact characterization of the prior-free optimal mechanism. While these results can be applied to profit maximization, we consider a more interesting objective of "residual surplus" which is the difference between the valuations and the payments.
Joint with Tim Roughgarden
Dr. Hartline's current research interests lie in the intersection of the fields of theoretical computer science, game theory, and economics. With the Internet developing as the single most important arena for resource sharing among parties with diverse and selfish interests, traditional algorithmic and distributed systems approaches are insufficient. Instead, in protocols for the Internet, game-theoretic and economic issues must be considered. A fundamental research endeavor in this new field is the design and analysis of auction mechanisms and pricing algorithms.
His hobbies include playing sports such as ice hockey, soccer, volleyball, and ultimate; appreciating arts such as fashion, theater, and dance; and participating in sporty-arts such as lindy hop and aerial acrobatics.
Dr. Hartline joined the EECS department (and MEDS, by courtesy) in January of 2008. He was a researcher at Microsoft Research, Silicon Valley from 2004 to 2007, where his research covered foundational topic of algorithmic mechanism design and applications to auctions for sponsored search. He was an active researcher in the San Francisco bay area algorithmic game theory community and was a founding organizer of the Bay Algorithmic Game Theory Symposium. In 2003, he held a postdoctoral research fellowship at the Aladdin Center at Carnegie Mellon University. He received his Ph.D. in Computer Science from the University of Washington in 2003 with advisor Anna Karlin and B.S.s in Computer Science and Electrical Engineering from Cornell University in 1997.
More information available at: http://www.ece.northwestern.edu/~hartline/
