podcast -- Yahoo Answers users seek advice, opinion, as well as expertise in research by Mark Ackerman, Lada Adamic and STIET fellow Eytan Bakshy
Podcast discussing the STIET research program with Jeff MacKie-Mason and Tom Finholt
podcast -- Yahoo Answers users seek advice, opinion, as well as expertise in research by Mark Ackerman, Lada Adamic and STIET fellow Eytan Bakshy
Podcast discussing the STIET research program with Jeff MacKie-Mason and Tom FinholtNeslihan Uler
Research Fellow, Research Center for Group Dynamics, ISR, UM
4-5:30 pm
UM: 411 West Hall
WSU: 313 State Hall (via videoconference)

The Revelation Principle depends on a seemingly innocuous assumptio theoretically outcome-equivalent (TOE) direct and indirect mechanisms are behaviorally equivalent as well. We use the first-price sealed-bid auction as our indirect mechanism and construct corresponding TOE direct mechanisms.
In contrast with what theory predicts, subjects behave significantly differently under direct and indirect mechanisms: (i) The revenue equivalence does not hold - the indirect mechanism generated higher revenue than the direct mechanisms, (ii) subjects behaved as if they were less risk averse in the direct mechanisms, (iii) moreover, we observed different bids across direct mechanisms. We show that a reference-dependent model explains the behavioral differences.
Link to the paper is: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~neslihan/Uler_auction.pdf
Neslihan Uler received a Ph.D in Economics at New York University in May 2007. Her fields of interest are experimental economics, development economics, public economics and applied game theory. Currently she is a research fellow at RCGD, Institute for Social Research.